There are no special rules for Litigants in Person if they failed to comply with Rules or Court orders.

Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12
On the 21st February 2018 the Supreme Court ruled against offering special treatment for a Claimant because he was a litigant in person and confirmed that the rules must apply equally to all parties.
The background of this case is that a Claimant, Mr. Barton, acting as a litigant in person, lodged an appeal against his former legal representatives in a claim for professional negligence. His former representatives instructed solicitors to defend the claim. Normally his claim form would have been served by the Court, however Mr Barton chose to serve it himself. On the day prior to the end of the limitation period Mr. Barton emailed the claim form to the Defendant’s solicitors despite the fact that the Defendant’s solicitors had never confirmed that service by email would be accepted. Mr Barton received an automatic reply, with a number to contact if the case was urgent, which he did not use. There was no substantive reply until approximately 2 weeks later, when the Defendant’s solicitors stated that service by email was not accepted. Therefore, in the absence of valid service, claim form had expired unserved and the claim was now statute-barred. Mr. Barton argued that the service was valid as he was dealing by email with the Defendant’s solicitors previously. In the alternative, he sought an extension of the validity of the claim form, or, pursuant to CPR 6.15, an order that the service by email be validated. He was refused at first instance and the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision that there was no good reason to validate service. Mr Barton then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by a majority of three to two and decided that there was no good reason to retrospectively validate the Claimant’s service of the claim.

The Court ruled that Mr Barton should have checked whether he could email a claim form and that without such permission his claim was invalid. Lord Sumption, giving the lead judgment, stated that “lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the Court… The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties.” He added that “Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”

Also Lord Sumption emphasised the hazards of leaving service to the last minute. He said: “none of this would have mattered if Mr Barton had allowed himself time to rectify any mishap. But having issued the claim form at the very end of the limitation period and opted not to have it served by the Court, he then made no attempt to serve it himself until the very end of its period of validity. A person who courts disaster in this way can have only a very limited claim on the court’s indulgence in an application under CPR rule 6.15(2).”

The Appellant’s further submission that the previous decisions were incompatible with Mr Barton’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights was also dismissed. The rules on service were considered to be “sufficiently accessible and clear”. Moreover it was found that “it is not the rules that have deprived Mr Barton of the ability to press his claim. It is the Limitation Act which has produced that result” and the Act does not contravene Article 6.

However, despite the fact that this appeal was dismissed all five members of the Court concluded that the Civil Procedure Rule Committee should look at the issues covered by the appeal.
Following this judgment, it is clear how crucial correct service of the claim form can be. Those seeking to serve a claim form should take particular care to comply with the rules as to service. Even if a Claimant made a genuine mistake with no prejudice to a Defendant it will rarely be sufficient to allow the exercise of the CPR 6.15 dispensing provision.